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1. The intention of this article is to offer an initial reading of the encyclical letter Caritas in 
veritate (hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, CV), set in relation to the individual research itineraries 
of the authors in the sphere of law and economics.
1
 It also benefits from suggestions gathered in the 
course of a series of meetings that took place between November 2009 and the time at which this 
paper was drafted in the Faculty of Economics of the University of Florence. The underlying 
conviction is that the faculty of economics, which is home to the study and teaching of economics, 
business economics, law and quantitative disciplines, represents the ideal site for such reflections. 
Moreover, an ―interdisciplinary dimension‖ – moving towards a broader synthesis that brings 
together faith, theology, metaphysics and science – is the proprium of the very social doctrine of the 
Church (nos. 31, 53).
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Given the plurality of methods and languages that derives from this, it would be 
inappropriate here to overemphasise a specialist approach, so as not to lose sight of the path of 
dialogue and the essential overall view (no. 51). Nevertheless, we shall inevitably have to 
concentrate on a specific subject, and hence risk belittling a document of much broader scope, 
which sets at the centre CV, that is, Charity in truth. This is the hermeneutic principle of a social 
encyclical that unfolds in a series of theological passages that are extremely sophisticated and thus 
difficult for an inexpert reader. However, as we can deduce from the opening page, the papal 
document is addressed to a broad circle, comprising both the lay faithful and all people of good 
will. This indicates the clear intention of entering the public debate at all levels. In particular, those 
who are engaged in seeking elements that indicate significant changes in the mode of ―doing‖, and 
prior to this, ―conceiving‖ business, however sensitive they may be to the upheavals taking place in 
the external environment that can affect business culture, cannot – despite all potential cultural 
resistance
3
 – fail to take into consideration an encyclical that focuses the current need for a 
―profoundly new way of understanding business enterprise‖ (no. 40). 
On the keynote of, as we said, an interdisciplinary reading that sees enterprise as the 
crossroads of multiple interests, it is not irrelevant to reconsider it as one of the social groupings in 
which human personality is expressed (to borrow a phrase from article 2 of the Constitution of the 
Italian Republic). The encyclical sets itself in a similar perspective:
4
 the caritas in veritate in re 
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sociali is central, the truth of Love immersed in ―human social life‖, in what are the principal 
manifestations of human relations. Here the family is not considered ex professo (no. 44), rather 
international society, political society and the economic societies come first.
5
  
The social teaching of the Church has already expressed itself on the question of enterprise, 
focusing at different times on the right to economic initiative as a fundamental right of the human 
being, on the aims of enterprise and on enhancing the value of the labour acquired within the 
corporate organisation.
6
 A definition which, to exploit legal terminology, focuses on the personal 
and community perspective that also characterises our Republican Charter, can be derived from the 
Centesimus annus  (no. 43): ―A business cannot be considered only as a ‗society of capital goods‘; 
it is also a ‗society of persons‘ in which people participate in different ways and with specific 
responsibilities, whether they supply the necessary capital for the company's activities or take part 
in such activities through their labour.‖ The subject of enterprise also emerges in several places in 
the pages of the CV (nos. 38, 40, 41, 46, 66), with various points that call for ulterior examination. 
2. When the encyclical states that the present time, marked by phenomena such as growth in 
scale and territorial outsourcing, requires a ―profoundly new way of understanding business 
enterprise‖ (no. 40), it does so on the one hand to point out that ―one of the greatest risks for 
businesses is that they are almost exclusively answerable to their investors, thereby limiting their 
social value‖, and on the other, and as a consequence of this, to note that there is also ―increasing 
awareness of the need for greater social responsibility on the part of business‖, and hence that 
―business management cannot concern itself only with the interests of the proprietors, but must also 
assume responsibility for all the other stakeholders who contribute to the life of the business: the 
workers, the clients, the suppliers of various elements of production, the community of reference.‖ 
This is followed by a mention of the ―new cosmopolitan class of managers‖, answerable only to a 
similarly delocalised and elusive group of shareholders, and to the ―anonymous funds‖ that 
determine the remuneration of these technocrats. Reference is also made to the appeals previously 
made by Paul VI ―to give serious attention to the damage that can be caused to one's home country 
by the transfer abroad of capital purely for personal advantage‖ and John Paul II who ―taught that 
investment always has moral, as well as economic significance.‖ The discourse of Benedict  XVI 
continues, underscoring the need to avoid a ―speculative use of financial resources that yields to the 
temptation of seeking only short-term profit, without regard for the long-term sustainability of the 
enterprise‖, a sustainability that elsewhere the teaching had already identified as economic 
sustainability – ―when a firm makes a profit, this means that productive factors have been properly 
employed‖(Centesimus annus, no. 35) – and that is declined here in terms of ―benefit to the real 
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economy,‖ and of ―attention to the advancement [...] of further economic initiatives in countries in 
need of development‖, enabling definition of the requirements of a, so to speak, ethical outsourcing. 
This is the first section of the encyclical that is of interest here.  
The so-called social responsibility of the enterprise may be reduced to a mere list of good 
intentions unless the issue of the effective application of principles and rules is addressed. Deriving 
from this is the fundamental function of law in economic life that the teaching of the Church has 
always duly emphasised,
7
 and which certainly does not escape Benedict XVI (infra § 5). 
As regards the business interest as delineated above, this is no novelty either. Nowadays 
even the legal system implements the general interest in certain business models (cf., for example, 
the social co-operative pursuant to article 1 of Law no. 381 of 8 November 1991 and the social 
enterprise pursuant to article 1, subsection 1, of Legislative Decree no. 155 of 24 March 2006, no. 
155). We can even come across regulations that make explicit reference to the ―general interest of 
the system of enterprise‖8 which ―is in line with the major trends of modern juridical culture that 
considers the interest of the enterprise as an entity which is not restricted to the interest of the 
businessman, but refers to the higher sphere of the interest of the enterprise in productive efficiency 
(the interest of the enterprise per se) or corresponds to the point of balance between conflicting 
interests.‖ 
In an even broader perspective, while by now ―we cannot do without an analysis of the 
regulations and values of Community legislation, which domestic legislation must comply with and 
implement‖, it is increasingly necessary to acknowledge that the ―Italo-Community legal system‖ 
aims both to ―support enterprise‖ and also ―to protect consumers, in the control of competition and 
the maintenance of the balance of exchange‖, and hence in ―everything that contributes to the 
prevention and elimination of the so-called market defaults and the stimulation of competition with 
a view to fostering a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of the local economic 
activities.‖9 Hence, the ―concept of market‖ that emerges is ―that of a complexified place, enhanced 
by the participation and representation of the various interests that operate within it, or that are 
influenced by it. The scheduled integration of economic policies with those of the consumers and 
the environment within Community law […] consolidates this vision of the market as a place that 
the legal system itself wishes to be open to the effective participation of the various stakeholders 
and interests, fostering the consideration, comparison and balancing of the same.‖10 
Evidently not everything is in harmony with such a prospect. It‘s not necessary to recall the 
theories on corporate social responsibility, in particular the well-known concept of the profit motive 
enterprise.
11
 It is sufficient to call to mind what has happened over the last thirty years, in which ―we 
move from a historical context dominated by the idea that enterprise can be ‗multi-objective‘, that is 
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aimed at the pursuit of an economic goal and also at compliance with various restrictions of a social 
nature, to another in which business appears to be aimed solely at the short-term financial benefit of 
the shareholder, while ‗the tangible and ideal interests of the employees, of the local communities, 
of the suppliers and the state of the environment have been eliminated from its decisional 
horizon‘‖.12 In those years what prevailed was the ―aspiration to the private‖;13 ―what emerged and 
developed was a global enterprise that was ‗substantially‘ socially irresponsible‖;14 the ―social 
interest‖15 is almost unequivocally declined in legal theory as the the short-term financial interest of 
the controlling shareholder and top management. This was the period of the privatisations, the years 
of the decline of solidarity, of the deregulation of the capital and labour markets, of Community 
restrictions and, in parallel, of the contraction of the Welfare State; years of immigration and 
globalisation; years in which the underlying causes of the great global crisis came to fruition. These 
are phenomena of epochal significance, which the encyclical must perforce address. 
3. The vision of business interest delineated by the encyclical appears at least more 
circumstantiated if – like Benedict XVI – we consider the enterprise as an activity, as a sequence of 
co-ordinated actions, rather than as a unicum with a similarly singular result. 
Certainly, breaking down the productive process into phases, even in terms of efficiency and 
efficacy, is another perspective that is anything but original: it is already present in the legislative 
texts, and undoubtedly ―the social sciences and the direction taken by the contemporary economy 
point to the same conclusion‖ (no. 37). And in fact, ―doing business signifies […] also co-
ordinating a plurality of contracts, governing the rights of a multitude of stakeholders,‖ so that ―the 
optimal combination between freedom and law, between public and private, between rules and 
incentives, thus represents the long-term problem of economic policy as government of society.‖ 
This is what the economist writes; and it also condenses ―for the jurist the role that the business 
absolves and, at the same time, the ‗problem‘ of the enterprise today.‖16  
The quid pluris consists in this, that in every phase of economic activity, from the location 
of resources, to the financing, production and consumption, every business action inevitably has 
―moral implications‖ (no. 37). In the encyclical, the discussion regarding justice in economic 
relations is shifted to ―how‖ to produce the profits and ―how‖ to use them (no. 21). On the one hand 
this continues to involve the relationship between economics and law, and on the other it leads to a 
scrutiny of the individual phases in the economic cycle, while on yet another it contemplates the 
different organisational models set at the disposal of private entities by the legal system. 
To the first issue, the complexity of the relations between law and economics, and the fact 
that one cannot disregard the other and vice versa, we shall return later (§ 5). What is certain is that, 
from the very first encyclicals, the social doctrine of the Church has always maintained that civil 
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power is not ―a mere guardian of law and of good order‖ (Quadragesimo anno, no. 25) and it still 
prefigures a capitalist market economy circumscribed within a ―strong juridical framework‖.17 
The latest encyclical too can be placed in the same groove already carved out (nos. 35, 36, 
37), with an additional detail: relations between private entities must be based on conditions of 
fairness rather than corrective legal action (no. 37). This remark harks back to issues of contractual 
justice and European contract law. But the encyclical is also conscious of the decline of national 
sovereignty in the age of globalisation, so that there is ―urgent need of a true world political 
authority‖ (no. 67), in a scenario that is otherwise dominated by vast private entities 
(multinationals) ―in relation to which the individual is ‗weak‘‖,18 characterised by a discipline of 
international trade that still features a ―marked ‗imbalance‘ in favour of mercantile logic to the 
detriment of public interest, social values and human rights.‖19  
As regards the individual phases of the economic cycle the CV devotes specific observations 
to the use of capital, as we have seen, but also to savings (no. 65) and even to consumption (no. 66), 
with a responsible exercise of both being enjoined. Consumption in particular, in current legal-
economic thought, tends to free itself of the dogma of the sovereignty of the consumer, thus 
overcoming a strictly private dimension. In continuity with the traditional statements – ―Justice is to 
be observed not only in the distribution of wealth, but also in regard to the conditions in which men 
are engaged in producing this wealth.‖ (Mater et Magistra, no. 82) – Benedict XVI too is concerned 
with the modes of production, and especially with the environmental consequences (nos. 48, 51). In 
the same way, to guarantee the right of the consumer (and the worker) to health and safety, the 
current legislation moulds the economic activity leading from production to consumption through a 
passage from the ethos to the norm that has already been largely achieved.
20
  
Among the productive factors, labour is the traditionally most recurrent capital in the social 
teaching of the Church. There are clear resonances between what we read in the CV, and previously 
in the Laborem exercens (no. 8),
21
 and then also in the Centesimus annus – it is ―possible for the 
financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people — who make up the firm's most valuable 
asset — to be humiliated and their dignity offended‖ (no. 35) – and what is written by certain jurists 
sensitive to constitutional legality.
22
 No less evident, moreover, in theory and above all in practice, 
are conflicting statements and denials.  
The CV critically reconsiders the role of the unions (no. 64), notes the impact of new 
phenomena, such as migrant flows (no. 62) and the deregulation-shattering of the employment 
contract (nos. 25, 32) in relation to the post-Fordist enterprise.
23
 Benedict XVI insists on the 
subjective aspects of work, expressing himself on this point with the same strong language used by 
his predecessor, pondering the current meaning of the word ―decent‖ in regard to work. 
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The answer consists of a list – introduced by the repetition seven times of the formula ―work 
that....‖  (no. 63) – which indicates more the results to be pursued than the routes by which to 
achieve them. 
They are nevertheless phrases that give us food for thought when connected with the current 
transition of labour law  which, not without tension,
24
 from a ―marked inclination towards ‗having‘ 
(stability, uniformity) […] appears to be shifting its pivot […] towards ‗being‘, that is to the 
individual.‖ 
4. With regard to mission and corporate governance too, we can discern a close affinity 
between the social doctrine of the Church and several current legal and economic trends. Here I 
have in mind, for example, the design of the economic relations that can be derived from the Italian 
constitutional Charter (articles 41, 45 and 46 of the Constitution).  
Mater et Magistra (nos. 72, 76) expressed a not dissimilar inclination in favour of the artisan 
enterprise, co-operation and the small agricultural enterprise. CV pursues a broader and more 
updated approach. It take in a principle of pluralism in models of enterprise, underscoring a ―broad 
intermediate area‖ between profit and non profit, a ―new composite reality embracing the private 
and public spheres, one which does not exclude profit, but instead considers it a means for 
achieving human and social ends‖ and stressing its consequent and well-defined finalism: ―What is 
needed […] is a market that permits the free operation, in conditions of equal opportunity, of 
enterprises in pursuit of different institutional ends. […] It is from their reciprocal encounter in the 
marketplace that one may expect hybrid forms of commercial behaviour to emerge, and hence an 
attentiveness to ways of civilizing the economy. Charity in truth, in this case, requires that shape and 
structure be given to those types of economic initiative which, without rejecting profit, aim at a 
higher goal than the mere logic of the exchange of equivalents, of profit as an end in itself‖ (no. 38). 
Correspondences with what is written in the CV are to be found in contemporary juridical 
thought. The plurality of the organisational models of enterprise is not even debated; clearly an 
appraisal is not made in the terms outlined above, but the point is nevertheless clear: ―the 
organisation is neutral but it is not causal. The rules are generally devised on the basis of the 
scheduled outcome‖, so that ―when the scheduled outcome changes, the organisational rules change 
too‖.25  Accountability too tends to be shaped in consequence. At times the neutrality of the legal 
models for the running of business has been posited, and this can be true in the sense that they are 
interchangeable  on the basis of individual decisions (cf., for example, art. 2500-septies and 
following of the Italian Civil Code). But in practice this is not the case: ―There is a content 
corresponding to each form and it is not possible to separate form from content.‖26  
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Moreover, the legal status of the enterprise, while necessary, is not sufficient to obtain 
specific results.
27
 The same could be said of many other institutions and norms of the private law of 
enterprise and possibly of law in general. Jurists of different extraction, at different times and on a 
range of arguments, have considered that juridical discourse indubitably offers ―resources‖, while at 
the same time being hampered by equally undeniable ―limitations‖.28 
5. Despite this, the CV continues to entrust law with the role of ‗regulating’ the constitution 
and operation of a world political authority – echoing moreover the hopes already expressed by 
Pope John XXIII in the encyclical Pacem in Terris – making it possible to effectively address the 
impact of the new ―global‖ economic system on the now prevalently ―local‖ protection of people‘s 
rights. Evidently, the proposed solution emerges from the consideration that the policies agreed at 
international level would appear to pursue an economic interdependence of political and 
constitutional implications, rather than a political and social integration that gives rise to the sharing 
of economic policies.
29
 In effect, for Pope Benedict XVI, in the face of the relentless growth of 
global interdependence and in the presence of a similarly global recession, there is inter alia an 
urgent need for a juridical reform of the international economic and financial architecture: ―To 
manage the global economy; to revive economies hit by the crisis; to avoid any deterioration of the 
present crisis and the greater imbalances that would result […]‖ (no. 67). 
Hence the objective is the creation of ―a political, juridical and economic order which can 
increase and give direction to international cooperation for the development of all peoples in 
solidarity.‖ (no. 67). With a view to achieving this objective, such a world political authority would 
need to be universally recognised by the national States and above all to be vested with effective 
power (no. 67). 
Such a prospect sets before the jurist who wishes to approach an analysis of it, exploiting his 
customary methods, no few problems to address: from the most immediate, such as what the 
juridical nature of such an authority is to be and where its geographical location ought to be etc. 
through to more complex issues relating to the effectiveness of the law, or how such an authority 
can impose its decisions at ―local‖ level. 
Any such analysis would probably end up being conditioned by the dominant ideological 
framework and by status quo. For these reasons, it seems to us that the aspect of greatest interest is 
another for the jurist who, in the interim, wishes to explore the role that such a political authority 
ought to play in relation to the economic systems or, perhaps it would be better to say, the economic 
system represented by the global market. In this case too it is clear that the analysis cannot fail to be 
affected by the various theories postulating the type of relation that there should be between the law 
and the market. And here the jurist will necessarily have to interrupt his analysis, conscious of the 
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fact that such an approach could not contribute to the identification either of the new architecture of 
the economic and financial system or, still less, to the definition of the sphere of the political 
legitimisation of the powers of the world authority. In short we would find ourselves addressing a 
problem of ideological approach to market regulation activity that cannot be summarised in a single 
viewpoint. 
In the CV this problem emerges when it is stated that ―the market does not exist in the pure 
state. It is shaped by the cultural configurations which define it and give it direction‖ (no. 36). And 
that economy (I would add, hence also the market economy) and finance are instruments that man 
can ―use badly‖ when motivated by purely selfish ends, since the ―economic sphere is neither 
ethically neutral, nor inherently inhuman and opposed to society‖ (no. 36). As such, economic 
activity ―must be structured and governed in an ethical manner‖ (no. 36). To this end, the global 
economy needs ―just laws and forms of redistribution governed by politics‖ (no. 37) more than in 
the past when economic activities were prevalently circumscribed by territorial limits. 
The idea, already present in the Rerum Novarum, that to sustain itself the civil order also 
needs the intervention of the State for purposes of redistribution cannot be reproposed tout court in 
a global economy: ―Not only is this vision threatened today by the way in which markets and 
societies are opening up, but it is evidently insufficient to satisfy the demands of a fully humane 
economy‖ (no. 39). If the redistribution alone is insufficient to bring about the economic and social 
development of peoples, even those who are better off (Populorum Progressio, no. 44), then we 
have to ask ourselves what role the State can play in the economy to make the best possible 
contribution to guaranteeing the values upon which the encyclical focuses. 
Elements for potential meditation are certainly not lacking in the CV. 
In the encyclical Pope Benedict XVI declares that the State-market relationship is not 
exclusive, but must also take civil society into account. However – again according to Pope 
Benedict XVI – a fundamental inconvenience to be avoided is that this binary model may corrode 
society in the unresolved conflict between ―giving through duty‖ and ―giving in order to acquire‖ 
(no. 39). 
A second point for reflection relates to the observation formulated by Benedict XVI apropos 
the State: the role of the State is not redundant, on the contrary, for the resolution of the financial 
crisis its role appears destined to grow, regaining many of its competences (no. 41). Where the State 
rests upon weak constitutional systems, it can be sustained by the ―development of other political 
players, of a cultural, social, territorial or religious nature‖ (no. 41). Here the analysis becomes 
more complex, and would call for an appraisal that is beyond the scope and the purpose of this 
paper. Moreover an attempt at interpretation could prove not particularly useful in the end for the 
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prospected exploration that we are addressing here. On the other hand, concepts such as ―State of 
law‖ and ―democracy‖ are in fact easier to indicate than to identify. 
Further, as has been observed, possibly with a touch of provocation, ―for the first time in 
human history there is a single clearly dominant state form, the modern constitutional representative 
democratic republic.‖30 
There emerges a third reflection connected with the previous: in post twentieth-century 
society, in these mediated forms of democracy a no longer marginal role comes to be played by the 
so-called intermediate bodies or, rather to update this expression to fit the times, the middle society, 
or in other words ―that society that represents the world of work and of enterprise and the 
mutualism of the social subjects has given rise to free associations recognised and regulated in view 
of their social impact, such as the trade unions, the representative associations, the Chambers of 
Commerce and the NGOs‖.31 Among these, in particular, among the representative associations 
emerge the consumers‘ associations which, in the CV, are identified along with those they represent 
– namely the consumers – as a ―new political power‖ (no. 66), underlining as desirable for them, as 
long as they are not manipulated by associations that fail to genuinely represent them, a more 
incisive role as a factor in building economic democracy (no. 66). 
This approach appears to imply acknowledgement of the fact that, in a context of market 
interconnection such as the present, the political dimension represented by the ―national‖ parties is 
no longer the only benchmark for the ―citizens‖. The reasons are manifold, but one appears to 
prevail over the others: the mystification of politics with the market. The acknowledgement by the 
political power of the market‘s status as an ―order‖ in its own right. And the demonisation, in the 
name of an efficiency, technique and economy that are an end in themselves, of interest in its public 
dimension in favour of a private and individualist vision. The identification of the public interest 
with the Leviathon has ousted from the consciences of those engaged, for various reasons, in 
making decisions of a political and economic nature, the concept of social community and of the 
―common good‖ so frequently called up in this encyclical: ―To desire the common good and strive 
towards it is a requirement of justice and charity‖ […] ―to take a stand for the common good is on 
the one hand to be solicitous for, and on the other hand to avail oneself of, that complex of 
institutions that give structure to the life of society, juridically, civilly, politically and culturally» 
(no. 7). 
The ―common good‖ leads us to address the distinction of conceptual status between legal 
principles and values. Is the ―common good‖ that is spoken of in the encyclical a legal principle or a 
value? The jurist cannot escape answering this question on pain of making a futile use of his 
instruments. It has been remarked that ―law tends to make communal human life possible, that is, it 
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pursues the common good‖,32 and that ―the political common good, understood as the creation of 
conditions that enable individuals and groups to obtain certain goods in relation to which the State 
is not competent or is neutral, always implies choices and actions that cannot be made in the spirit 
of moral neutrality so dear to many liberal political philosophers. The State […] cannot be morally 
neutral, not even when it has to recognise, protect and foster rights that […] envisage a specific 
limitation of its competence‖.33  The risk that we run is that of confusing a legal principle with a 
value for the promotion of the action that both call for. This risk can be avoided if we acknowledge 
that the legal principle expresses modal predicates whereas the value is extraneous to indications of 
content. In the absence of such distinction the ―common good‖ can become a subject of dispute, in 
terms both of the manner in which it is pursued and of the ends pursued. In such a way, in effect, as 
to relegate it to the status of a value that society can disregard, void of meaning, as argued by Hayek 
with regard to ―social justice‖, where he claims that ―no-one has yet found even a single general 
rule from which we could deduce what is ‗socially just‘ in all the specific cases that would fall 
within that given rule‖.34  
In the CV, the distinction between values and legal principles is influenced by the more 
general formulation of the social doctrine of the Church which ―has unceasingly highlighted the 
importance of distributive justice and social justice for the market economy, […]. Without internal 
forms of solidarity and mutual trust, the market cannot completely fulfil its proper economic 
function‖ (no. 35). Solidarity and mutual trust between those who ―operate‖ in the market and those 
who are called upon to ‗direct‘ it with a view to achieving the common good appear to be identified 
as instruments through which the prevalence in the juridical order of power logics conditioned by 
private interests can be avoided (no. 5). Solidarity is one of the constitutional principles contained 
in the Charter of the Italian Republic: it is expressed both in article 2 (supra § 1) and in article 119 
of the Constitution. And trust? Is it a legal principle or a value? Or rather, a rule of behaviour which 
is functional to law. Law, in fact, can introduce rules aimed at safeguarding trust in the markets, as 
envisioned in Community law among the aims of the supervision of the authorities appointed to 
regulation of the financial sector. And so perhaps the problem that arises is how to guarantee the 
trust? What are the tools that the various judicial orders identify to guarantee trust in the financial 
markets, for example?  
It is in following this path that we come to the central reflection, namely the problem of the 
regulation of the market in line with the teleological model delineated in the CV. Benedict XVI 
himself recalls that the Church has no technical solutions to offer, and nor does it presume to 
interfere in the politics of the States. The task of the Church is that of indicating to politics what it 
considers to be the path to be travelled in order to move, already in our earthly life, towards the 
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―City of God‖. This path assumes taking a step backwards with regard to our reason, and returning 
to the ―fundamental values‖ that must guide the action of those who are called upon to play a social 
role. Can we speak of a plurality of values or of a single fundamental value? It is understood that 
were we to discover a plurality of fundamental values we would have to address the complex task 
of identifying a criterion of classification.  
Notwithstanding this, in the encyclical it is not difficult to identify, as the fundamental value 
to which all the rest refer, the safeguarding and valuing of the human person in his or her integrity 
(no. 25). The very world political authority to which we referred earlier must ―make a commitment 
to securing authentic integral human development inspired by the values of charity in truth‖ (no. 
67). And one of the demands of charity and truth is that the traditional principles of social ethics 
find a place within normal economic activity. But how? Can law be an instrument functional to this 
end? Or is it too incapable of avoiding the limitations that are implicit in it by virtue of the fact that 
it is generated by the human institution?  
The question of the relation between law and ethics has been amply debated by legal 
philosophers and sociologists, but less frequently among other jurists. As we know, even among 
economists the relations between ethics and economics have given rise to an extensive literature. 
The reason for this can intuitively be sought in the very concept of law which, unlike economics, 
we expect to be equipped with its own ―inner morality‖.35 It is only when law comes into conflict 
with values that are extraneous to the constitutional principles that ethics becomes a valuation 
criterion for both legislation and jurisprudence. Nevertheless, while the relation between law and 
ethics tends to be ―conflictual‖ as regards human events – concerning issues such as the conception 
of life, birth control, abortion and divorce, the forms of cohabitation between people, scientific 
research and its limitations, the availability of life in its terminal stages – when we are dealing with 
juridical norms established to regulate the economic and financial system such opposition rarely 
takes shape. In this case, in fact, the traditional principles of social ethics are principles of law. 
Despite this, as we know, the ―quasi‖ coincidence of ethos and nomos has not prevented either the 
so-called market defaults or the financial scandals. 
The various systems of regulation that have been organised at State level to control the 
financial market have revealed themselves ineffective in guaranteeing the protection of the 
―common good‖; they have become permeable by the amoral forces that drive the financial market, 
or that refute as invasive any type of control on the part of the public power in the name of a natural 
law little inclined to the service of the human person. 
It scarcely seems incidental that the inefficacy of the juridical orders in the adequate 
regulation of the financial system has increased in frequency over the last two decades. Or that the 
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increase in the intensity of the phenomenon has involved political and economic systems with 
different institutional characteristics. Which immediately leads us to think of ―globalisation‖ as the 
prime cause of financial risk, as moreover also emerges from the CV. The natural conclusion that 
derives from this would be that without globalisation we would not have risked a repetition of 1929. 
This is however probably a hasty conclusion, which fails to take into consideration the fact that 
globalisation has merely contributed to raising the veil on the growing incapacity of the democratic 
States to guarantee the bridge between constitutional rights and their effectiveness on the part of the 
legislative and judicial organs. Almost everywhere politics has sought to get around this breakdown 
by choosing to expand along a track outside that marked by public law which, as described above, 
has accompanied the process of democratisation of authoritarian liberalism and the passage from 
the State of law to the Welfare State, from the single-class State to the multi-class State.
36
  
As has been observed, ―a model in which the operators consider any move legitimate, in 
which there is a blind belief in the market‘s capacity for self-regulation, in which grievous 
embezzlement is common practice, in which the regulators of the market are weak or are prey to the 
regulated, where the remuneration of the top business managers is for the most part ethically 
intolerable, cannot be a model for the growth of the world.‖37 
6. However, if the market and the principle of laissez faire cannot be considered self-
sufficient, as  consistently stated by the social doctrine of the Church, which has insisted upon the 
crucial role of law in economic life; and if law too is not exempt from failure, even in elaborating 
systems of control for business strategy: if this is the case then we must heed the recent warning of 
the Holy Father: ―What man needs most cannot be guaranteed to him by law.‖38 And again, from 
the encyclical: ―Charity goes beyond justice […] but it never lacks justice […]. The earthly city is 
promoted not merely by relationships of rights and duties‖ (no. 6, but see also nos. 35, 36). Or, in 
lay language: ―Contracts and laws […], while necessary, do not suffice to guarantee an advanced 
and civil social order‖.39 
Since the intention is to seek the quid pluris that can still serve man and human coexistence, 
the authors of these comments cannot but refer to the reading of the encyclical. This is not to say 
that the social doctrine of the Church contains answers to all the possible questions. It can even 
disappoint those who seek therein technically exhaustive solutions (no. 9 and Sollicitudo rei 
socialis, no. 41), despite the fact that authoritative segments of the Church are beginning to discern 
the need to translate the principles into more detailed solutions. The encyclical tends, however, to 
offer value guidance; that is it aims to suggest and propose – certainly not impose – principles 
capable of being translated into implications in the various fields of social action, guidelines 
inspired by community personalism. This is based on the premise that the ―driving force‖ behind a 
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―good‖ life and a ―good‖ society, even a ―good‖ enterprise, the engine of integral – not merely 
economic – development, consists in a ―new humanistic synthesis‖ (no. 21), in a man ―open to the 
Absolute‖ (nos. 16,74,78), possessing an original vision of the social reality: in short the CV.  
These last statements, while on the one hand they reiterate the humanist postulate that is the 
constant weft of the social doctrine of the Church, and which appears as submerged in the broad 
consciousness as it is ever-present in all the fundamental nodes of contemporary life,
40
 on the other 
they also bring into play the metaphysical prospect that, where not rejected a priori, engages the 
social scientist.
41
 The transcendence may even sound like a ―provocation‖. However, ignoring it 
would mean eluding the passage of the CV (no. 21) cited at the beginning of the presentation page 
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